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University of Leeds
Abstract
Many common approaches to modality pose problems for accounts of modal
knowledge that are no less severe than those thought to plague David Lewis’s account
in terms of a plurality of concrete worlds. Typically, these theories are framed
in terms of the wrong kinds of thing and their defenders misdiagnose the failings
of Lewis’s plurality. These considerations provide the foundations for modalist
accounts of modal knowledge, where modality is not primarily a matter of recherché
objects.
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1 Introduction
Themetaphysical foundations of modality havemost certainly occupied great prominence
in late twentieth century and early twenty-first century philosophy. The possible worlds
framework has itself been the most prominent amongst the developed metaphysics
of modality. What began as a formal development took on philosophical seriousness
with David Lewis’s Counterfactuals (Lewis, 1973) and fuller development in On the
Plurality of Worlds (Lewis, 1986).1 His, of course, was not the only development of
the framework. Lewis maintained that possible worlds are spatio-temporal wholes, but
Robert Adams thought of them as sets of propositions (Adams, 1974), Alvin Plantinga
took them to be states of affairs (Plantinga, 1969, 1974), and for Robert Stalnaker they
were properties (Stalnaker, 1976, 1984).
Though some philosophers stared at Lewis incredulously because he embraced many
isolated space-time wholes ((Lewis, 1973, p. 86) and (Lewis, 1986, pp. 133–135)), I
will argue that similar reactions are warranted not only to other versions of the possible
worlds metaphysics, but also to other more traditional metaphysical frameworks that have
been deployed to account for the metaphysics of modality. The well-founded incredulity
arises from rather fundamental epistemological problems due to what the proponents of
those frameworks themselves say about their own proposals. The problematic features of
those frameworks are not hidden from view but are typically explicit features, ofttimes
thought to possess merits that make them more suitable for the epistemology of modality
than are Lewis-style worlds. Some nearby variations of these accounts are also subject
to an under-appreciated complaint.
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2 A Challenge, A Dodge, and A Problem Revisited
2.1 Peacocke’s Integration Challenge
A quite general constraint on any metaphysical component of a theory is that it meet
what Christopher Peacocke calls “the integration challenge” (Peacocke, 1999, Ch. 1).
This challenge requires that a philosophical theory makes plausible how it is that, if the
world is the way the theory says it is, the likes of us could ever be in a position to know
that it is that way. Not only must the theory account for how we could know that there is
some class of objects, but if the structure of that class is to be correlated with details of
our own beliefs, then some accounting of how that correlation is something rather more
than a cosmic coincidence is also required.
Metaphysicians tend, somewhat understandably, to focus only on establishing some
claim of the form: there are Fs. What is usually given no explicit attention is how it is
that the relevant premises of the argument for Fs could provide the kind of warrant for
claims made about the kind of objects that Fs would be, were there to be any. Perhaps
some semantic or syntactic considerations are advanced. Perhaps these considerations
are quite plausible in a range of uncontroversial cases concerning Gs, for instance. These
uncontroversial cases might render those semantic or syntactic considerations plausible
grounds for embracing Gs because not only do we have those semantic or syntactic
considerations to go on, we also have other means of gaining access to the items in the
relevant range of ‘G’, typically empirical observations. Behind the scenes and largely
unarticulated—-often because the matter is so painfully obvious that we all have better
things to do with our time than to belabour these obvious details—is some accounting
of how it could be both that Gs are as they are and that we have come to do the things
we do with G-related words that they serve as reasonably reliable markers of both the
existence and characters of Gs. Precisely because we interact with Gs in all of their
variety and splendour we come to communicate about them as we do.
The integration challenge, however, is not addressed in a satisfactory manner
if, observing that similar semantic or syntactic facts characterise our uses of ‘F’ as
characterise our uses of ‘G’, we proceed to think that those facts about our uses of ‘F’
suffice for warrant the claim that there are Fs or that the Fs are this way and that. The
challenge does not require that the specifics of our beliefs and uses of language regarding
Gs be applied to the case for Fs. After all, if Fs and Gs are not the same there must be
some differences at the level of very fine details. When the concern is over the existence
of lions, and tigers, and bears, the gory details do not matter because, again, for obvious
reasons, it is no great mystery how the interplay between our experiences of lions, tigers,
and bears might differ in the fine details yet be sufficiently similar in ways that would
explain how those animals could be as they are, our beliefs could have come to be as
they are, and the deeply embedded features of our language could have come to be as
they are in ways that make the latter reliable indicators of how things are.
So, the challenge is very general. If the slogan is “Metaphysics and Epistemology
Unite!” it is not a very prescriptive command. Indeed, so far as I am concerned here, it
is not even the demand that someone somewhere eventually work out the hard, tedious
details of both the metaphysics and the epistemology of Fs. It is really the barest of
challenges: at the very least, say enough to dispel the utter mystery of how Fs, our
beliefs and attitudes about Fs, and our language pertaining to ‘F’ could come to be
sufficiently in sync that our beliefs, encoded in our languages as they might be, bear
some semblance to reality. That is hardly too much to ask.
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2.2 Philosophical Misdirection
When defending some version of the truth-conditonal theory of meaning, I complained
that “anti-realist” semantic theories were misguided because the theory entailed that
typical declarative sentences are about what they were plainly not about (Shalkowski,
1995, esp. pp. 521–522). Someone hears me say something, but is unsure how to
interpret my remarks. That person explicitly queries my meaning. In the lion’s share
of cases, I am the speaker and I am the one who intends to convey some information.
To that extent I am important to a conversational exchange. Beyond that, though, I am
unimportant. It might well be that I am too self-absorbed for anyone’s good and that
this vice leads me to speak too much about myself too often. These are lamentable
biographical facts about me, but these and many other facts about me are not what even
most of my own utterances are about. However self-centred I might be, when I say
‘snow is white’ nothing about me (and because on this count I am definitely not special,
nothing about you either) enters into the picture about what I mean when I use that
sentence on the most typical occasions. It is not about me. It is not about you. It is not
about us, about our actual, hypothetical, or counterfactual experiences, or about our
current, possible, or ideal theories, either. That much seems plain.
If not about me/you/us, what then? Snow and its colour, of course. What else? Yet,
according to the semantic theory I was arguing against, the meaning of a sentence was
its use or its verification conditions. So, according to versions of this semantic theory,
when I tell you that snow is white, that Paris is in France, or that the Moon is Earth’s
only natural satellite, I am saying something (no doubt complex and very implicit) about
how ‘snow is white’ or ‘Paris is in France’ or ‘the Moon is Earth’s only satellite’ is used
or how things would appear to me or to you or to typical observers were they to look
outside at the appropriate time and place or to where they must travel to view the Eiffel
Tower or possible orbiting vantage points from which to observe Earth.
Each version is problematic. On the “meaning as use” theory, the sentence itself
enters into what it means. That is more than odd; it is downright perverse. We might
well concede that the Liar Sentence (‘This sentence is false.’) is self-refential, but ‘snow
is white’ and most other sentences are not. Part of the peculiarity of the Liar is its
apparently self-referential character. Any theory that makes this peculiarity ubiquitous
is suspect. ‘Snow is white’, as it were, says nothing about itself, but something about
snow. Not only does it say nothing about itself, it is not about any sentence at all. It is
about something not at all linguistic. It is about something with a chemical structure,
most typically H2O, in frozen form, common in well-known places during well-known
times of year, and the like. So, in answer to the question “What does ‘snow is white’
mean?” any answer that takes as its main subject the mentioned sentence itself is an
instance of philosophical misdirection. Sentences are typically “transparent”. They
disappear from view under normal usage. Like windows, they do their jobs best when
they are not themselves the subjects of attention. Any theory of meaning entailing that
sentences are inevitably, or even typically, opaque in this respect by calling attention to
themselves points us in the wrong direction regarding meaning.
Unbenownst to me at the time, Mark Johnston had already produced a very thorough
discussion of verificationist theories of meaning, which make us part of the meanings
of sentences ostensibly having nothing to do with us at all (Johnston, 1993). How
did we become part of the story of sentence meaning? There are, no doubt, many
truths about us regarding ‘snow is white’. Many of us think it true, think that we verify
it in well-known ways in the well-known conditions, and much more besides. That
there are many truths about both us and ‘snow is white’, though, does nothing to show
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that what the sentence means has anything whatsoever to do with us. Even if we use
it, verify it, manifest our understanding of it, and acquire and pass on our linguistic
practices in various ways—and even if all of these things are essential components of
a comprehensive theory of language—none of those, individually or severally, shows
that ‘snow is white’ means that any of those things are so. None of those facts are the
content of what I convey to you when I tell you that snow is white. You will likely give
little, if any, thought to me when I tell you that snow is white. When I manage to do so,
‘snow is white’ is transparent in the way I and most others almost always intend it to be.
This “philosophical narcissism”2 against which Johnson argued is an example of the
more general phenomenon of philosophical misdirection. Philosophical misdirection
occurs when we begin thinking about something and we re-frame the issue in terms that
do not really suit the original subject matter, but the new terms of the discussion become
the orthodox way of thinking about or expressing ourselves about the original subject
matter. Many of the past fifty years’ discussions of modality has been examples of
philosophical misdirection. We began by wondering about what, if any, was the modal
difference between 12 being the sum of 7 and 5 and Nixon having visited China, if we
are philosophers. If we are logicians, we began by wondering how to account for the
validity of certain forms of inference and whether there is some semantic framework that
could permit us not only to provide formal “definitions” of validity when the validity
depends upon modal expressions not available in first-order predicate logics but also,
if there is, how some such framework can account for the differences in the various
axiomatisable systems of modal inferences. We started with what look to be reasonably
“down to Earth” concerns and ended up, quite literally, transforming them into rather
other-worldly concerns. Consequently, the details of the possible worlds frameworks
themselves became the objects of intense scrutiny, resulting in widespread philosophical
distraction.
2.3 The Original Problem
More than two decades before Peacocke formulated his integration challenge, Paul
Benacerraf presented what came to be known a “the Benacerraf Problem”. This was
merely a more focused version of the challenge. Benacerraf encouraged us to look
carefully at the details of the various philosophical accounts of mathematics. The
apparently natural semantics for mathematical sentences seemed to commit users of
mathematical discourse to the existence of objects of which there was no good account
of knowledge or even reliable belief, while accounts of mathematical knowledge that
promised to deliver any such knowledge required mathematics to be about something
other than what it plainly seemed to be about (Benacerraf, 1973). What gives the
Benacerraf Problem its traction is careful attention to the specifics of the the relevant
families of philosophical theories about mathematical objects.
While we are being quite informal, there is, of course, no impropriety in using ‘7+5 =
12’, whatever one’s philosophical proclivities. That sentence under its typical, informal
interpretations is unquestionably a portion of established, completely uncontroversial
mathematics. It is only when one gets all philosophical about mathematics that problems
arise. Platonists tell us that mathematical objects are abstract, but in the absence
of an account of how the abstract and the concrete “meet” in ways that account for
mathematical reliability for those in the know, the theory is incomplete. The allegation
is not merely that not every ‘i’ is dotted nor every ‘t’ crossed in platonistic accounts
2Johnson’s term for the philosophical vice behind these theories of meaning.
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of mathematical knowledge. The allegation is that there is not even an outline of how
a mathematical epistemology could go, on the platonists own terms. Of course, all
acknowledge that standard mathematical proofs are part of establishing or refuting
mathematical claims. The platonist failing is to give no story at all about how standard
mathematical practices could be the right practices (or, at least sufficient practices, if one
makes allowances for others), if mathematical reality is as platonists say it is. It is one
thing to propose an epistemology that not all embrace, thus losing converts along the way.
It is quite another to have friend and foe alike completely flummoxed about how even
to begin to do platonist mathematical epistemology. For this reason, modelling modal
epistemology on the barest rudiments of platonist epistemology is rather unfruitful.3
The obvious alternative to platonism is some nominalistically-acceptable account of
what mathematics is about so that its subject matter, properly understood, is amenable to
reliable beliefs by the likes of us using themethods the likes of which bothmathematicians
and those doing much less sophisticated computations actually use. We keep our eye on
the mathematicians’ gold standard and propose:
I A mathematical claim is true iff there is a proof of that claim.
What should we make of the right-hand side of this biconditional that links mathe-
matical truth with proof? There is a proof? To retain a relatively robust intuitive sense
that the best mathematicians are in the business of discovery and not invention, such
proofs must be (composed of) abstract objects, making this attempt simply a version
of unembarrassed platonism that merely exchanges more typical mathematical objects’
characters and relations for proofs. So, this not usually the intention of a biconditional
linking mathematical truth and mathematical proof. This way of understanding this
attempt to link conditions of truth with conditions of knowledge, then, usually is not
even considered, since it solves no problem that platonism allegedly left unsolved.
An under-explored option for retaining the objectivity and discovery features of
platonism while collapsing mathematical truth and proof is to locate the business ends of
things in the mind of God, as does Brian Leftow when thinking about God and necessity
(Leftow, 2012). This has the virtue, if it is a virtue, of making proofs concrete. It also
has the virtue of providing the basis for at least gestures toward how the likes of us could
be reliable about the likes of these proofs that constitute (the basis for) mathematical
truth. God created us to be able to find compelling the divine beliefs that are the most
basic truths and to be able to reason sufficiently reliably from those basics to the contents
of further reaches of God’s mind. Even if God has no need to reason from one claim
to another, God thinks the logical relations and can construct us so that we can wend
our ways through the logical pathways, so that our thoughts can be, in content, God’s
thoughts. Because they defend their own views in terms of theoretical utility and because,
arguably, Leftow’s has no less theoretical utility than many other total philosophical
packages, by their own lights more philosophers should take seriously some theory such
as his. I will, however, leave this view to one side.4
Perfectly obviously and understandably for those ignoring Leftow’s preferred option,
the collapsing ofmathematical truth intomathematical proof bringswith it the recognition
that the frontiers of mathematics are less about discovery than they are about construction,
invention, or creation. Not willy-nilly, of course, since intuitionists observe well-known
limits on mathematical construction. The restriction to proofs actually produced by the
3For more on this, cf. (Bueno and Shalkowski, 2015).
4In the context of the nature of modality rather than its epistemology, I discuss Leftow’s view, with special
attention to how it fares compared to Lewis’s modal realism in (Shalkowski, 2015).
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likes of us has the virtue of solving the epistemological component of the Benacerraf
Problem, but at the cost of philosophical narcissism. I left implicit what must be
perfectly explicit, if it is to express clearly a genuinely nominalistic alternative to
standard platonisms. The existence of the relevant proof must be due to the mathematical
activity of the likes of one of us and not merely a different independently existing abstract
object for which the Benacerraf Problem arises yet again. That is what it is to be a
mathematical truth, according to this alternative, and we should not hide that feature
from view. It is right and proper now to look at the relevant biconditional in all it’s glory.
I′ A mathematical claim is true iff someone has proven that claim.
Many will judge that when we take I′ seriously on its own terms, we play too great a
part because 12 was the sum of 5 and 7, well before anyone had managed to prove this,
particularly if it needed to have been proven within the framework of set theory, using
Hume’s Principle, or any of the other going strategies, since they came onto the scene
very late in the day.5 We can try a fix.
I′′ A mathematical claim is true iff someone proves that claim.
Let ‘proves’ be a timeless verb so that someone proves something iff someone proves
it at some time or other. 12 was the sum of 5 and 7 by virtue of someone sometime
proving it. In the same way that spatial location is thought to be irrelevant, so perhaps is
temporal location. If not going from the frying pan into the fire, this attempted fix of
the initial problem requires resolution of other matters. Backward causation to rescue
truth prior to proof? A block universe to keep the truthmaker in place? At the very
least, it is somewhat odd that the proof of an abstract mathematical claim (as contrasted
with a mathematically-formulated empirical claim) should impose requirements on the
structure of space-time. Thus, the implications of this strategy should make us think that
we have acceded to philosophical misdirection, if we follow this general development
of a philosophy of mathematics. It is not that reality is different from how we thought
it was or even could be, it is that we are thinking incorrectly about reality when led to
think that these aspects of reality are intertwined in these ways.
3 The Fundamental Ersatzist Problem
After much stage setting, let us return to our main subject: modal epistemology. The
ersatzist programmes regarding possible worlds were attempts to do two things: (1) to
make the proposed modal ontology plausible and, (2) to make the specifics of modal
epistemology somewhat more tractable than they were alleged to be for Lewis’s ontology
of concrete, spatio-temporally isolated worlds.6 The first was accomplished because
the ersatzists’ ontologies were already widely embraced. They were widely embraced
because it was perfectly obvious that we have propositional knowledge since we wield
that-clauses regularly, we come to know some of what states of affairs obtain by ordinary
empirical observation, and we observe objects possessing all manner of properties. All
5We should be wary of this reason for rejecting I′, since it is cavalier in rejecting a claim about truth—a
metalinguistic attribute—on the basis of how things are. We can avoid this particular problem if we refuse the
semantic ascent and we restrict ourselves to instances, such as I∗: 7 + 5 = 12 iff someone has proven that
7 + 5 = 12. I do more to expose this confusion below and in (Shalkowski, 2014).
6For philosophical neutrality, let us treat ‘ersatzist’ as merely a label and nothing more. The disputes
between Adams, Lewis, Plantinga, and Stalnaker were over who embraced the real things and who were
distracted by mere reasonable facsimiles.
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that remained for the ersatzist programmes was to demonstrate how the various roles
possible worlds might fill are best filled by groups of propositions, states of affairs, or
properties. What has received too little patient attention is that each of the ersatzist
options fares no better than Lewis’s plurality of concrete worlds, when an analogue of
the Benacerraf Problem is pressed for possible worlds theories.
Certainly, ersatzists’ preferred objects had their share of respectable advocates, going
back to the ancient Greeks, but it would be merely an argument from authority were one
to think that fact made those objects any more philosophically respectable than Lewis’s
plurality. All options present the very same kind of problem as do mathematical objects.
If there is difficulty in seeing how to rise to the integration challenge for Lewis, the
problem arises no less for ersatzists. Historically, the problem was hidden for the reason
just given. It just seems obvious to so many philosophers that, unlike Lewis and his
worlds, we have knowledge of propositions, states of affairs, and properties and it seems
either heroic or foolish to maintain otherwise. This initial rationale for the incredulous
stares directed at Lewis arises from encountering a kind of philosophical duck-rabbit.
We encounter a philosophical duck-rabbit when an object possesses both a philo-
sophically innocent or neutral aspect and also a philosophically contentious aspect.
The duck-rabbit induces error when those aspects are not treated separately, since each
demands a quite different degree and character of justification than does the other. In the
same way that there is no impropriety in affirming that 12 is the sum of 7 and 5 when we
are being informal and not trying to articulate a claim suitable for philosophical scrutiny,
there is no impropriety in speaking of properties, states of affairs, or properties, if we like.
No nominalist is guilty of bad faith when doing so. The beginnings of some philosophical
mistakes occur only when we help ourselves to the obvious plausibility by first looking
at pre-philosophical understandings of expressions like ‘proposition’, ‘state of affairs’,
and ‘property’ and then add onto those understandings, philosophical characterisations
of each. Not to be confused with the philosophical task of tidying up and systematising
common opinion and rendering it into a sophisticated, rigourous theory, the failing arises
when we neglect the required subsequent epistemic updating. We err when take ourselves
to be entitled to retain much of our pre-theoretical understanding of and confidence
in the relevant matters after the philosophical characterisations and systematisations
have been done. Failing to do the requisite updating, ersatzists mistakenly thought that
their preferred accounts of possible worlds were more conducive to the project of modal
epistemology than was Lewis’s.
Let us begin with propositions and by agreeing that propositions are expressed by
that-clauses of English sentences.
J: Jones believes that snow is white.
According to J, Jones believes a proposition. On a platonist account of propositions,
this means that Jones bears a relation to an object:


 

SNOW IS WHITE . According to
those who embrace them, propositions are abstract objects. There may be much more to
say about them, but this is all that need concern us here. Being abstract, propositions
raise no fewer problems regarding our relations to them than do platonists’s numbers
or Lewis’s worlds. The problem is not with the pre-theoretic, rather unregimented
idea that propositions are expressed by that-clauses. The problem arrives with the the
platonist’s philosophical overlay. Once the theory of propositions incorporates the idea
that that-clauses are designators for abstract items in an ontology, the problem arises. In
general form, the problem is the very same as the Benacerraf Problem for mathematical
objects.
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We fall prey to a duck-rabbit when thinking about propositions asmore innocuous than
Lewisian worlds. There can be no controversy whatsoever over embracing propositions
as what is expressed by that-clauses. We can take that as stipulative. Propositions, in
this very limited way, have advantages over sentences. I believe that snow is white and
so do you. There is some respect in which we are correct to say that at least on this
matter we believe the same thing. We wish to maintain this also about those with no
facility at all with any language that any of us speaks, so it is no good to try articulating
what they and we believe by framing things in terms of sentences to which people assent.
They do not assent to any sentence to which we assent and we may return that dubious
favour. So, a first pass at a linguistic formulation in terms of sentences will not do.
The second and third passes might be in terms of how our sentences are intertrans-
latable or to which sentence(s) of some specific language one would assent, were all
else the same save that one spoke that particular language. Either of these strategies
is an example of philosophical misdirection. Even if each of these claims is true, it is
plain that the vast majority of our beliefs do not take as their objects linguistic items, if
our phenomenology is anything by which to go. Referents to linguistic items are not
parts of the contents of most beliefs. Those beliefs are not about those sorts of things
at all. Those beliefs are about snow, rain, and hail, about prime ministers, presidents,
and popes, or about any manner of other things, but they are most definitely not about
words, sentences, or even utterances. The great plausibility of the idea that any of these
nominalist-friendly options is an instance of philosophical misdirection prompts the
search for something else and propositions seem to fit the bill.
Both the platonist and the nominalist, however, are guilty of misdirection. Both
answers distract. When I believe that snow is white it is not because I am related to


 

SNOW IS WHITE or because I or we do or would do some things with the words
‘snow is white’. When I believe that snow is white I represent the world to myself in
the relevant way. When I believe that snow is white, no specific object, linguistic or
otherwise is involved in my belief. I believe that Nixon went to China and there is at least
one object involved in that belief, but it is not


 

NIXON WENT TO CHINA , it is Nixon.
Similarly, for other beliefs. The distraction is not that objects are (sometimes) relevant
to our beliefs, but that the wrong objects are thought to be relevant to our beliefs.
Furthermore, and more pointedly so far as the integration challenge is concerned,
exactly how do I manage to get into the correct relationship to


 

SNOW IS WHITE ? If
we think that the correct answer has something to do with having the relevant, personal
mental representation along with its attending relations to other representations, attitudes,
and tendencies, then we are inclined to the wrong kind of answer for platonists, even
if not the wrong answer. The alleged interrelations of representations, attitudes, and
tendencies are perfectly nominalistically acceptable. My representation is concretely
mine as are my other representations and attending attitudes and tendencies. It is by
virtue of all of these peculiarities that I believe that snow is white, but none of that
addresses any of the peculiarities of a platonistic account, which must account for
my relationship to


 

SNOW IS WHITE . Of course, there may well be “propositional
content” to many of those other mental states and there is no reason for anyone to deny
that. The relevant states may be, after all, expressible by way of that-clauses. We are left
with the fact that all that makes this account of belief a theory of various mental states
with platonistic propositional content are objectual forms of words: that snow is white,
the proposition that snow is white, the proposition that snow is white has different truth
conditions than does the proposition that Nixon went to China, etc. There is nothing
else to the theory that is especially platonistic. Since there is little else that counts as a
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theory that pertains to the crucial platonistic aspects of the theory, we should dispense
with the platonism. Those who resist this conclusion should at the very least face the
challenge to say more, in distinctively platonistic terms, that will address the integration
challenge, whether one puts propositions to work in a theory of modal reality or not.
The right response to this rejection of platonism, is not to redouble the effort to find
some nominalistically acceptable alternative object(s). There is nothing philosophically
interesting to substitute for platonist’s propositions. When Jones believes that snow is
white, Jones is not related to an abstract object, but neither is Jones related to some
recherché linguistic object, sentential or otherwise. J indicates that Jones represents
the world in a given way and that s/he has the requisite other attitudes and tendencies
surrounding that particular representation to constitute believing something rather than
merely wondering or wishing something. The philosophical misdirection occurs when
we get distracted from the correct objects, if any, that are involved in the content of our
mental attitudes. Believing that Nixon went to China, when true, relates one to Nixon in
some circuitous manner. There being the relevant object to which the believer is related
is part of what makes the belief true, but it is not what it is to hold a given belief. That
is just to represent and to treat that representation in the right ways. What makes one
person’s beliefs “the same” as those of someone else is what would make them true,
if the appropriate thing(s) were to exist and to be the requisite way(s), to put things
metalinguistically. To avoid the metalinguistic characterisation and to put things more
directly, people share the same belief, when they take the very same thing(s) to be the
very same way(s). It is not that, however the concrete things turn out to be, both parties
are related to yet another object. The existence and identity conditions that appear to
be those of propositions are really those of the relevant objects and how they would
be, were the various individuals’ representations correct. Parallel remarks will apply to
other candidates for ersatz possible worlds.
One might think that this accusation of philosophical distraction avoids commit-
ments to propositions only to embrace another abstract object: states of affairs. The
representations to which I gestured involved objects, if accurate, at the point of their
“truthmaker”. Plantinga, for instance, thinks of states of affairs as distinct from concrete
states. A state of affairs obtains (as contrasted with exists) when concreta are suitably
arranged. They are not themselves concreta suitably arranged. Thus, Plantinga happily
embraces a plurality of worlds as states of affairs, but only one spatio-temporal whole of
concreta suitably arranged. Thus, he is an actualist maintaining the obtaining of exactly
one world, but also the existence of however many possible worlds there might be, since
each of those are “merely” abstract. This brief sketch of Plantinga’s ersatzism shows
how it, too, falls prey to the integration challenge. It is the philosophical thesis that
these objects are abstract and not really just concreta suitably arranged that presents the
problem.
Properties, understood as they usually are by those who oppose nominalism, are like
propositions and states of affairs by being objects to which one is related when possesing
the relevant property. We are all familiar with the vocabulary typically used to express
philosophical claims about properties, at least as universals. An object is red when it
“participates in” or is suitably related to Redness . If ‘participates in’ is not merely a
façon de parler, then it must be a verb expressing a genuine relation between a red object
and Redness . This is supposed to do some important, substantive philosophical work.
That is the whole raison d’être of the philosophical machinery. If the machinery is fit for
purpose, then there must be more substance to it then serving merely as an innovative
way of saying that something is red. That there is precious little more to be said besides
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that participation in the universal Redness is really what it is for something to be red,
demonstrates that this theory, too, fails the integration challenge and so too does the
ersatzism built upon it. The relevant verbs used to express our alleged relations to these
abstract objects differ, but they are all mostly just placeholders to signify that there is
some relationship. In distinctively platonistic terms that is pretty much the end of the
matter, so far as what grasping or believing or obtaining or participating in comes to.
There would not, perhaps, be such a challenge were ‘proposition’, ‘state of affairs’ and
‘property’ merely pieces of pre-theoretic vocabulary with no philosophical ontological
overlay. Were each merely a façon de parler, there would be no problem, but there would
also be no interesting philosophical theories of mental states, truth makers, predication
or possible worlds framed in terms of them that are at all friendly to platonists and
conducive to the ersatzist projects. The problem arises precisely when the details of that
overlay are specified and the overlay is put to work explaining or defining things in a way
that is supposed to be “deeper” than the mere appearances that can be articulated with
any of the pre-theoretical vocabulary, all the while inheriting the epistemic credentials
of the pre-theoretic vocabulary.
4 How Did We Manage That?
4.1 Forgetfulness
There are, perhaps, many components to an explanation of how and why philosophical
misdirection occurs. One component may be simple forgetfulness or inattention. It
may be that, as I think it is in the philosophy of modality, a façon de parler is either
not recognised as such or else is forgotten to have been such. It seems fairly clear that
‘possible world’ was introduced as a façon de parler when the formal semantics for
modal logics was given as some variation of Kripke’s ordered triple 〈G,K,R〉, G being
a member of K and R a relation defined over the members of K (Kripke, 1963). It was
quite natural, dating well before Kripke’s elegant and popular presentation of this general
semantic approach to modal logics, to think of it as involving the set of all possible
worlds, the actual world and some relation(s) amongst worlds.7
As a mere manner of speaking, of course, there is nothing wrong with thinking of K
as a set of worlds, or even as a set of less complete possibilities or possible situations.
Formally speaking, all of this is a matter of indifference. Nothing hangs on it. The
manner of speaking aids those of us who are less technically proficient to grasp why
this formal structure and not some other is used or why these specific conditions are
imposed on the relation R and not some others.
If the function of the model-theoretic modal semantics is to model modal inference,
it just does not follow that one proposing that model is at all serious about the existence
and characters of those so-called worlds, any more than one constructing a model of an
internal combustion engine should become concerned with the melting point of various
kinds of plastics. Models are models; engines are engines. When working with an
engine, one must be concerned with the melting points of various metals and plastics,
since those facts make metals preferable to plastics for many parts of a functioning
engine. The concerns about what to use for a functioning model, however are not the
same as the concerns for what to use for a functioning engine. Where the model will not
model the combustion features of an engine, ice may be sufficiently suitable.
7The Introduction to (Copeland, 1996) provides a useful history of these matters.
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To model modal inference successfully, it hardly matters what is used. The “possible
worlds semantics” were typically formulated in set-theoretic terms. There were two
ways in which the character of those models do not matter. First, it does not matter
that sets were used. A point to which I will return at the end, modal inference is not
about sets, just as my belief that snow is white is not about


 

SNOW IS WHITE or
about ‘snow is white’. The sets were used not because that is what modal inference
is (always!) about, but because the set-theoretic language permits us to abstract away
from so many specifics about so many objects and relations that we are free of those
details and are, thus, able to focus only on the mere identity of members of sets and
some few relations amongst those members. The language enables us to express how it
could be that this inference is valid and that one invalid. It also permits us to model the
differences between logics. Were the things over which we wanted our modal inferences
to be valid like this or that, then we can see the differences between them and we can see
how some logics form a hierarchy of strength (K,T, S4, S5, the core of normal modal
logic) and how that hierarchy is related to some others.
Not all agree with me that ‘possible worlds’ for very long was a mere façon de parler.
They will think that the kinds of arguments advanced by Adams, Lewis, Plantinga, or
Stalnaker show that even if the formal models were mere models, they became more
than that when put to philosophical work very soon thereafter. They came to be tasked
with articulating important aspects of modal reality. I will not rehearse arguments I
have given elsewhere against Lewis’s use of theoretical utility arguments and the like as
failing to warrant his metaphysics (Shalkowski, 2010), (Shalkowski, 2012), which will
apply suitably adapted to the other programmes.
Even if I am right that treating ‘possible worlds’ as a referential expression and not
as a mere manner of speaking is unwarranted, note that Lewis’s use does not fall into
the distraction that is philosophical narcissism. Though his worlds involve us and our
counterparts in some well-known respects, we do not become the central players in
modality when the specifics of the theory are not merely gestured toward but spelled out
in fine detail. Indeed, the incredulous stares inflicted upon Lewis were born partly out of
the fact that his theory was modest in this regard: his worlds have so little to do with us
that his account appears to fall afoul of Peacocke’s integration challenge. Other versions
of the general framework were typically thought not to be so “extreme” and so, I gather,
were thought to fare better regarding that challenge and in fairly obvious manners.
What seemed to generate the mistaken idea that Lewis fared worse than did ersatzists
was the idea that Lewis’s major epistemological problem was generated because his
worlds, other than our own, were merely possible. They were not part of our world
and, so, inaccessible to us. The ersatzists’ favoured alternatives were actual objects
and, (apparently) so, were accessible to us. The source of the fundamental problem for
Lewis, though, was not an object’s actuality or mere possibility; it was its accessibility.
Ersatizists never took seriously the task of sketching accounts of how it could be that if
their favoured objects were as they were said to be they were any more accessible than
were Lewis’s merely possible worlds.
Indeed, Lewis’s own attempt to integrate abstracta into his programme placed them
outside of his spatio-temporal wholes (Lewis, 1983). They were literally neither here
nor there. They were in no possible world, so, strictly speaking, they were not actual
objects, no matter which possible world one inhabited. The ways Lewis and his critics
would have articulated the isolation of abstracta from parts of spatio-temporal wholes
would have differed, but they would have agreed on the essential point. They are not
spatio-temporal objects. Ersatzists assumed that their framework permitted them to say,
correctly at least by their own lights, that abstracta were actual objects and that this
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sufficed to overcome without argument at least one of the problems posed for Lewis.
Their claim that abstract objects are actual objects, however, does nothing more to satisfy
the integration challenge, properly understood, than did Lewis’s denial.
4.2 Failure to Update
The main explanation for instances of misdirection, however, is the failure to update. A
constraint on rationality is that one’s beliefs be sensitive to changes to one’s evidence.
When things thought to be true are later thought to be false or vice versa, one ought to
go through a process of updating one’s other beliefs in light of new information. At
least, one ought to do so on occasion and when matters are sufficiently important. In
the case before us, it was the failure to update that permits an initially plausible and
uncontroversial claim to retain credibility when it should not.
For propositions, states of affairs, and for properties, it is easy to see how this could
happen. Since it is nearly a point of early stipulation that propositions are the content
of that-clauses, saying that Jones believes the proposition that snow is white is, then,
merely a verbose way of saying that Jones believes that snow is white. We may even
permit a kind of counting. Jones also believes something else, a different thing. Jones
believes that grass is green and, so, from our stipulation, Jones believes the proposition
that grass is green. Believing that snow is white is quite plainly not the same as believing
that grass is green, so to the same degree of plainness believing the proposition that
snow is white is different from believing the proposition that grass is green and that is so
because the proposition that snow is white is distinct from the proposition that grass is
green. Another portion of grist for philosophical mills is the idea that we have just used
several different forms of English sentences to express what Jones knows. To the extent
that that-clauses are used to express Jones’s beliefs and the content of propositions, then
it is clear that propositions so understood have something to do with what Jones knows
and to what Jones has access.
Say no more and there is nothing about which philosophers should dispute. Apart
from the stipulation about ‘proposition’, nothing is philosophical. This is all the very
kind of thing that any philosophical account of mental states, linguistic meaning, and
the metaphysics of such must account. It is, therefore, philosophically neutral precisely
because it is not yet at all philosophical.
At some point, though, someone insisted on getting philosophical and saying that
propositions are abstract or that they are concrete. Regardless of how one becomes
philosophical, the initial judgements about what Jones does/does not know must be
revisited in light of the new theoretical apparatus. The new philosophical content, at the
very least, demands that one ask (and answer!) how we can still be entitled to both the
initial uncontroversial claims as well as to the distinctively partisan content introduced
when one waxed philosophical about that matter. Updating is required to insure that
what was taken as data to justify a theory can still be accepted as data, if the theory is
embraced. It is easy to see how the updating process might require a configuration of
the theory to account for what had been taken for granted or even rejection of something
initially thought to be uncontroversial. In an extreme case, updating would actually
defeat the theory.
Suppose the existence of something were taken for granted, perhaps because some
observational claims are taken to be true. Suppose, further, that the theory ultimately
developed entails that that thing does not exist. If the existence of the thing was central
to the case for the theory, the theory was so poorly constructed that it was self-defeating.
If the theory is correct, then the data for the theory are false. If the data are false, then
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there is no case for the theory. So, if the theory is correct, there is no case for it. Not a
good outcome.
I do not yet maintain that ersatzist views are similarly self-defeating. That is stronger
than the arguments here warrant. I claim only that a substantial problem has been hidden
from view and that its hiddenness is partly explained by the failure to recognise that the
introduction of philosophical theory requires updating and that the details of the theory
might render implausible what previously had been uncontroversial. Remarks similar to
those about propositions apply to states of affairs and properties.
5 Other Misdirections
Of course, not everyone is fascinated with the possible worlds accounts of the nature
of possibility. We should not ignore theories that ignore them altogether. One very
natural way of addressing concerns over the epistemology of modality is to advance the
claim that modal knowledge is a function of conceptual knowledge. Perhaps one can
ignore altogether the issue of the nature of possibility and go straight for a solution to
the epistemological concern. After all, the metaphysical wizardry should be in service
of the quite mundane questions of how it is that I can know that were I to leave Leeds for
Belgrade and travel on foot rather than by plane, it would take me far longer to arrive at
my destination. Just answer that question and many are content enough, just as I need
not know the nature of my television set and its remote control in order to know that
pushing this button activates the television, pushing that button changes the channel,
and pushing the other button lowers the volume. Children manage all of this and much
more with equipment the workings of which they have no comprehension. So, perhaps
going straight for conceptual issues will yield answers to knowledge questions.
In theory, perhaps, but not in practice. As soon as one articulates the claim that
modal knowledge is (a function of) conceptual knowledge, we should insist on receiving
more information. Tell me more about what concepts are. If they are sufficiently like
Platonic Ideas, the very same Benacerraf-like challenge arises. If concepts are like that,
how do we manage to acquire the conceptual knowledge that is the basis for modal
knowledge?
Suppose they are not like Platonic Ideas. Suppose they are more like the components
of our representations. More probing is still warranted. Our representations? The
Platonic option had the advantage that if a concept exists and each of us is related to it,
then there is an account of how that one concept could be a component of both your
representation and mine. We are each related to the very same concept. If concepts
are not like Platonic objects, are we still entitled to think that any single concept is a
component of both my representation and yours? Certainly, not on accounts of concepts
that make them quite person-specific. My mental representation of something is mine
and it cannot be yours. Where exactly is the middle ground that avoids some version of
the Benacerraf Problem and yet permits us to share concepts in the way required by an
account of modal knowledge?
Perhaps that problem can be solved. More worrying, though, is that we must revisit
the problem of philosophical narcissism. Why would one think that something like
non-platonist concepts would be so much as relevant to the question of modal knowledge?
Why would a thorough understanding of the painting in my front room provide anyone
good grounds for thinking that any portion of reality is encoded in that painting? Indeed,
since I have yet to tell you much about the painting, you plainly do not know whether
it even has the appearance of being a piece of representative art. I tell you that it has
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that appearance. The relations of colours resemble the relations of colour one might see
somewhere in the world. That is still not nearly enough for thinking that it provides any
information at all about reality. Having been to Venice, I can tell you that it resembles
one portion of Venice. When I tell you that it is a print of a Canaletto, then if you know
that he spent time painting Venetian scenery, you might conclude that at least some
portions of the painting provide some useful information about Venice. The images of
building, perhaps. I would not, though expect to go to that portion of The Grand Canal
and see those very Gondoliers, even if they had been there when Canaletto painted the
original.
Note the triangulation required to make plausible that just a modest amount of
information about something beyond the painting could be taken from the painting.
Mere inspection of the painting would not suffice. Some information about what Venice
really is like, or at least what it was like, is required before the representation itself is
any use at all. Without that information, no amount of inspection of any number of
paintings would be much use, even if there was a great deal of consistency between them,
as there almost surely is, since paintings have too little of both detail and comprehension
to exclude the representational nature of other extraordinarily different paintings.
Taking modal knowledge to be conceptual knowledge runs the risk of importing to
conceptual knowledge what is not yet warranted for it. Without something that counts
as non-conceptual knowledge forming part of a more comprehensive theory about how
concepts arise and exactly what they track, the inspection of concepts will be no more
useful than the inspection of all the painting in my home (of which there are few) or even
in the whole world. Philosophical narcissism can be avoided, but only if an accounting
of concepts is given that shows how they track modally-relevant reality.
Avoiding the mental in favour of the linguistic will do no more than vary the specifics
of the challenges and tasks for accounts of modal knowledge. Languages (and their
constituents) construed as Platonic objects will face the Benacerraf Problem. Those
avoiding the problem because languages are construed as perfectly concrete objects will
face the question of why these things are even so much as relevant to questions of modal
knowledge. If they are not themselves the constituents of modal reality, why would
looking to them yield any information at all about modal reality? Once again, I do not
say that this and related questions cannot be answered in a satisfactory manner. I call
attention only to the relatively unnoticed but crucial question that should be answered at
some stage of this kind of account of modal knowledge.
6 A Reminder: The Use/Mention Distinction
All of the programmes I have discussed are instances of philosophical distraction
because, in the end, these are not what modality is or is about. Philosophical discussions
of modality and our modal knowledge are most typically framed in distracting ways.
Consider the most elementary of arguments:
1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Socrates is mortal.
What is this syllogism about? At the very least, Socrates and some of his interesting
characteristics. What it is not about is a proposition, a sentence, a concept, or even
a mental representation. Recalling the distinction between using the language and
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mentioning portions of it, it is clear that in their most typical uses, arguments are all
use and no mention. Yet, so often when speaking about arguments, we lapse into
presentations that are nearly all metalinguistic in character. We speak of the truth of the
premises guaranteeing the truth of the conclusion. Or, the truth of the sentences used in
or the propositions expressed by the premises insuring the truth of the sentence used in
or the proposition expressed by the conclusion.
Having taught elementary logic and having at least once tried to keep all of my
vocabulary in the object language, it became obvious why we lapse into metalinguistic
formulations of analyses of the virtues and vices of even quite specific arguments. It
is just easier. It takes fewer words to talk of the truth of the premises than to talk of
conditions expressed by the premises. When we verbally gesture to the board or screen
and ask students to inspect “premise 2”, we clearly refer them to a sentence. We know
that they know what it means and because the implicit reference is to a sentence, it is
perfectly natural to frame questions in terms of its truth value and to relate that value to
those of other sentences.
Pedogogically, so far as teaching logic is concerned, there is absolutely no impropriety
in any of this. It does, however, facilitate a kind of philosophical distraction to frame
things in metalinguistic terms. The argument is not about sentences or propositions, so
no perfectly serious and sober account of arguments should be framed in metalinguistic
terms, in the final analysis. A metalinguistic presentation should be seen for the façon de
parler that it is. When the logic is even more formal and natural language sentences give
way to sentence letters, connectives, and perhaps quantifiers, variables, predicates, and
functors it is even more natural to present things metalinguistically precisely because
there is nothing that the relevant premises and conclusion are about. One of the points
of formal logic is to isolate features of (in)validity that can be accounted for completely
in terms of form, with no remainder for content to accommodate.
The very same point applies to modal inferences. Modal logic typically being treated
as an extension of sentential or first-order logics, it is certainly no more natural to present
new technical material in a way that reminds us that typical particular instances of modal
inferences are all use and no mention and that truth values and their possible relations
are relevant only derivatively. Thus, it is no surprise that most philosophical discussions
suffer from deeply entrenched distractions and that we are here, and elsewhere, quite
cavalier about the specifics of our accounts of the modal and of modal knowledge. All
of this is so, even though strictly speaking, even according to the formation rules for
formal modal languages, both ‘’ and ‘^’ are no more metalinguistic that is ‘certainly’.
Grammatically, each can prefix a sentence to yield another sentence. Using none of
those expressions turns the resulting sentence into something concerning metalinguistic
matters.
By way of an extended discussion of matters bearing on the epistemology of both
theories of modality and of specific modal claims, I recommend accounts that ultimately
have nothing to do with possible worlds—ersatz or otherwise—propositions, states
of affairs, properties, mental representations, concepts, or sentences, except in some
derivative fashion. The use of modal inferences reveals a very this-worldly character
about many of our uses. If Socrates not only is a man, but is one necessarily, the primary
locus of concern is Socrates, what it is to be Socrates, what it is to be a male human,
etc. What it is for ‘Socrates is a man’ to be necessarily true or for ‘Necessarily, Socrates
is a man’ to be true or for the proposition that Socrates is a man to be necessarily true,
or for Socrates necessarily to fall under the concept

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Man or for ‘is a man’ (suitably
interpreted) to apply necessarily to Socrates are all subsidiary issues. At the very least,
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ignoring the secondary issues will permit us to get on with the job of modal epistemology
without detours.
It is worth noting that at least on this count, once again, Lewis was nearer the mark
than were the ersatzists. He certainly expanded the domain over which to quantify, but
his focus was alway on the primary issue. What did or did not occur with Socrates (and
perhaps his counterparts) is what mattered to resolving modal issues and the knowledge
of what did or did not occur with Socrates (and perhaps his counterparts) is the primary
issue of the epistemology of modality. The latter troubled so many about his possibilism,
as it should have done. Nevertheless, with respect to where to look, at least his account
of modal reality made the primary enterprise clearer than did many alternatives.
7 Conclusion
The task of modal epistemology must begin in the right place so that scaffolding and
other aids that might help us in the task are seen as scaffolding and aids. There is a time
and place to be fascinated with the details of scaffolding, so that it will serve well its
intended purpose. Nearly all of the time, however, the scaffolding is discarded so that
the building or the sculpture can be as intended and not obscured. Ersatz worlds, their
constituents, or other actualist alternatives obscure our vision, whether by permitting us
to indulge in philosophical narcissism or by some other form of philosophical distraction.
When doing empirical investigations, we could become similarly distracted. We
could frame things for ourselves in terms of what propositions are or would be true, or
what concepts fundamental entities fall under, and the like. We do not, however, because
the empirical investigator is compelled to be much more conscious of doing things,
not with word so much as with things. Labs must be financed, built, outfitted, staffed,
and operated. Materials must be shipped in, stored, preserved, heated, cooled, melted,
or burned. People must sometimes travel to witness events or to acquire materials for
further study. One cannot be long fooled that primarily one is doing things with words,
however much one might do things with words. Philosophers have little choice but to use
their minds, formulate claims to themselves and others, assess claims by thinking through
possibilities, etc. Our concern, though, is no less about things—ordinary things, and not
recherché things. Whether that demands the embrace of the Aristotelian essentialism
that Quine so reviled is a further matter. Whether our concepts actually do encode useful,
even if revisable information about Socrates or human beings is likewise a further matter.
It is important, though, to recognise it and related matters as the further matters that
they are.
References
Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1974. “Theories of Actuality.” Noûs 8:211–231.
Benacerraf, Paul. 1973. “Mathematical Truth.” The Journal of Philosophy 70:661–679.
doi:10.2307/2025075.
Bueno, Otávio and Shalkowski, Scott A. 2015. “Modalism and Theoretical Virtues:
Toward an Epistemology of Modality.” Philosophical Studies 172:671–689. ISSN
0031-8116. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0327-7.
Copeland, B. Jack (ed.). 1996. Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
16
Johnston, Mark. 1993. “Verificationism as Philosophical Narcissism.” Nous-Supplement:
Philosophical Perspectives 7:307–330.
Kripke, Saul A. 1963. “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.” Acta Philosophica
Fennica 16:83–94.
Leftow, Brian. 2012. God and Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, David. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
—. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, David K. 1983. “Postscript to ‘Counterpart Theory and QuantifiedModal Logic’.”
In Philosophical Papers, volume 1, 39–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, Christopher. 1999. Being Known. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Plantinga, Alvin. 1969. “De Re et De Dicto.” Noûs 3:235–258.
—. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Shalkowski, Scott A. 1995. “Semantic Realism.” The Review of Metaphysics 48:511–538.
Shalkowski, Scott A. 2010. “IBE, GMR, and Metaphysical Projects.” In Bob Hale and
Aviv Hoffman (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, 169–187.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 2012. “Modal Integration.” Philosophia Scientiæ 16:85–98.
—. 2014. “God With or Without Abstract Objects.” In Paul Gould (ed.), Beyond the
Control of God? Six Views on The Problem of God and Abstract Objects, 143–154.
London: Continuum.
—. 2015. “Necessity, Worlds, and God.” In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth and
Other Enigmas, 217–240. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1976. “Possible Worlds.” Noûs 10:65–75.
—. 1984. Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
17
